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1. Introduction
While many studies concentrate on theoretical models for 
the pricing of corporate bonds and credit risk, there has 
been much less empirical testing of these models. Yet, 
there are several reasons for investigating the determi-
nants and behaviour of credit spreads. First, both the US 
and Euro corporate bond markets have grown rapidly in 
recent years. The Euro market, which lags its US coun-
terpart, has become broader and more liquid, and the 
number and the market value of Euro corporate bonds 
have more than doubled over the last ﬁ  ve years.
These developments have potentially affected ﬁ  nancial 
stability. The growth of the corporate bond markets has 
signiﬁ  cantly inﬂ  uenced the composition of portfolios held 
by ﬁ  nancial institutions, industrial ﬁ  rms, trusts, and private 
investors. It is likely that the portfolios of these investors 
have become more (geographically) diversiﬁ  ed. Investors 
can also construct portfolios that better ﬁ  t their needs and 
expectations of return and risk, which will improve the 
allocation of capital. On the other hand, the increased 
reliance by corporates and households on ﬁ  nancial market 
instruments such as corporate bonds has also increased 
the dependence of these investors and borrowers on 
ﬁ  nancial market prices.
A second reason for studying the determinants of credit 
spreads is that the credit derivatives market, including 
structured ﬁ   nance products such as collateralized debt 
obligations (CDO) and asset-backed securities (ABS), 
has experienced considerable growth over the last two 
decades and is expected to grow strongly in the coming 
years. Some structured products such as collateralized 
bond obligations (CBO) are backed by a large pool of 
corporate bonds. This implies that the cash ﬂ  ows (coupon 
and principal) of the underlying bonds determine the 
proﬁ  tability of these structured products  ; therefore, the 
creditworthiness of corporate bonds is important for the 
analysis of these products.
Finally, central bankers use credit spreads to assess 
(extract) default probabilities of ﬁ  rms and to assess the 
general functioning of ﬁ  nancial markets (credit rationing 
and sectoral versus macroeconomic effects). In addition, 
the credit spread is often used as a business cycle indica-
tor. Having a better understanding of credit spreads will 
help central bankers to extract more precise information 
from bond prices/spreads.
The contributions of this article are threefold. First, we 
present an empirical analysis of the determinants of credit 
spread changes on Euro corporate bonds between 1998 
and 2002. This is one of the ﬁ  rst analyses of the determi-
nants for different types of Euro corporate bonds based 
on rating and maturity. In choosing the determinants, we 
are led by the structural credit risk models pioneered by 
Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). Our results 
show that factors suggested by the structural credit risk 
models, such as the level and the slope of the default-free 
term structure, the stock price, and the stock price vola-
tility signiﬁ  cantly affect credit spreads on Euro corporate 
bonds. An important result is that the sensitivities of credit 
spreads strongly depend on the rating and the maturity 
of the bonds. Furthermore, liquidity risk is an important 
determinant of credit spreads, especially those on lower 
rated bonds. Second, we compare the sensitivities of credit 
spreads on US and European corporate bonds to ﬁ  nancial 
and macro-economic variables. A review of the existing 
literature on US and European credit spreads shows that 
no more than 45 p.c. of the dynamics of credit spreads 
can be explained. Furthermore, although the US and the 
European corporate bond markets differ signiﬁ  cantly in 
terms of market value and number of bonds, empirical 
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results for bond markets in both regions are very similar  ; 
i.e. the impact of ﬁ  nancial and macro-economic news on 
credit spreads is similar in the US and in Europe. We ﬁ  nd 
that credit spread changes depend more on bond char-
acteristics such as rating and maturity than on country or 
currency of issuance.
Several possible explanations have been put forward to 
explain the gap between observed credit spreads and 
estimated spreads from existing empirical models. These 
explanations include liquidity risk, taxation, systematic 
shocks, and diversiﬁ  cation risk (see Collin-Dufresne et al. 
(2001), Elton et al. (2001), Delianedis and Geske (2002), 
Driessen (2003), Houweling et al. (2004), D’Amato and 
Remolona (2003), Van Landschoot (2004), and Perraudin 
and Taylor (2004)). Although there is no consensus on the 
relative importance of each of these factors, most studies 
conclude that liquidity risk and systematic shocks sig-
niﬁ  cantly inﬂ  uence credit spread changes. D’Amato and 
Remolona (2003) are the ﬁ  rst to suggest that the unex-
plained portion of the dynamics of credit spreads is actu-
ally a premium for diversiﬁ  cation risk. According to these 
authors, investors would need a much larger number of 
bonds in order to have a well-diversiﬁ  ed portfolio than the 
number of stocks necessary for diversiﬁ  cation.
Along these lines, a third contribution of this article is a 
comparison of the simulated loss distributions of bond, 
stock, and mixed (made up of bonds and stocks) portfo-
lios. Our simulations suggest that the distribution of bond 
portfolios is more skewed to the left than is the distribu-
tion of equity portfolios for the same ﬁ  rms. This suggests 
that an investor may well need more bonds than stocks 
in order to have a well-diversiﬁ  ed portfolio. However, the 
skewness of mixed portfolios is very similar to that of 
stock portfolios. This calls into question the importance of 
skewness of the distribution of bond portfolios for large 
investors, such as ﬁ  nancial institutions with large portfo-
lios of bonds and stocks. Furthermore, this analysis does 
not give any indication of the importance of diversiﬁ  cation 
risk as compared with other factors discussed in the litera-
ture such as liquidity risk and systematic shocks.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. 
Section 2 gives an overview of the developments in the 
US and Euro corporate bond markets and brieﬂ  y discusses 
some well-known measures of credit risk. In Section  3, 
we discuss the theoretical determinants of credit risk, 
i.e. the determinants that follow from structural credit 
risk models. Section  4 reports the results of an empirical 
analysis of the determinants of Euro credit spreads for bonds 
with different ratings and maturity (1998-2003). Section 5 
reviews the empirical literature and compares results for 
European and US credit spreads. In Section 6, we discuss 
other potential factors that could inﬂ  uence credit spreads 
and present the (simulated) loss distributions of hypothetical 
portfolios of stocks and bonds. Section 7 concludes.
2.  Corporate Bond Market
2.1 Market  Developments
Before discussing some measures of credit risk and the 
determinants of credit risk, we brieﬂ  y describe develop-
ments in the Euro and US corporate bond markets over 
the last three decades. (1) These developments explain 
why the US corporate bond market has been stud-
ied much more than the Euro corporate bond market 
(see Section 4.2).
Chart 1 presents the outstanding amounts of US and 
Euro investment grade corporate bonds.  (2) While the US 
investment grade corporate bond market had an average 
outstanding amount of 200 billion dollars in the 1970s, 
the Euro corporate bond market did not exist. Over the 
(1)  In what follows, the Euro corporate bond market is deﬁ  ned as Euro-denominated 
bonds issued by EMU countries.
(2)  Chart 1 presents the outstanding amount of the Merrill Lynch US and Euro 
corporate bond index. See Section 4.2 for a more detailed discussion of the data. 
Although the US and Euro high yield corporate bond markets are much smaller 
than their investment grade counterparts (between 15 and 30 p.c.), they show a 








































































CHART 1  OUTSTANDING AMOUNT OF INVESTMENT 
GRADE US AND EURO CORPORATE BONDS
  (Billions of US dollars)
Source : Bloomberg (Merrill Lynch).
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last decade the outstanding amounts of both markets 
have sharply increased. In January 2004, however, the 
  outstanding amount of the US corporate bond market 
was still much higher than the ﬁ  gure for the Euro corpo-
rate bond market.
One source of growth in corporate bond markets has come 
from reactions to the low-interest-rate environment by inves-
tors such as ﬁ  nancial institutions looking for higher returns. 
These investors are moving away from cash, government 
bonds, and other lower return liquid investments in favour 
of investment grade corporate bonds. This has boosted 
corporate bond issuance. Another source of corporate 
issuance is the wave of merger and acquisition activities. 
Although the Euro corporate bond market has grown sig-
niﬁ  cantly, the average number of US corporate bonds issued 
on a monthly basis is still ﬁ  ve times higher (see Chart 2).
For the US corporate bond market and the Euro corporate 
bond market respectively, the composition of the issuance 
has shifted from higher rated bonds to lower rated bonds, 
especially BBB rated bonds. This increase is mainly led by 
the higher returns that investors can earn on BBB rated 
bonds compared to AAA rated bonds (see Section 5). 
Chart 2 shows that this is not only a temporary shift over 
the last three years. From 1990 to 2003, the composi-
tion of the issuance of US corporate bonds has continu-
ously shifted in favor of lower rated bonds. In 2003, the 
issuance of BBB rated bonds was ﬁ  ve times as high as 
the issuance of higher rated bonds (AAA and AA rated 
bonds). Much of this shift is demand driven. Furthermore, 
mature markets seem to be better suited than less devel-
oped markets for issuing lower rated bonds because they 
are more transparent and liquid.
2.2  Measures of Credit Risk
Investors should be aware that shifting from government 
bonds to corporate bonds involves credit risk. Credit risk 
mainly covers two components  : (i) default risk and (ii) 
recovery risk. Default risk reﬂ  ects the fact that the coun-
terparty in a ﬁ  nancial contract (e.g. bond issuer) may not 
be able or willing to repay the contractual coupon and 
face value.(3) The recovery risk captures the uncertainty 
about the proportion of the loss that will be recovered if, 
e.g., bondholders default.
The credit spread gives an indication of the market’s 
assessment of credit risk. The literature presents two well-
known measures for credit risk  : (1) bond yield spreads, 
and (2) credit default swaps (CDS) spreads.  (4) Another 
measure, which will not be discussed in detail here, is a 
ﬁ  rm’s credit rating. The latter measure primarily reﬂ  ects 
the likelihood of default and does not necessarily pro-
vide the most adequate assessment of the debt’s credit 
quality. Even if credit ratings predict a substantial part of 
credit spreads, they do not tell us what information is 
relevant for credit spreads. Furthermore, changes in the 
ﬁ  rm’s credit quality, especially credit deteriorations, do 
not always result in immediate rating changes because 
of a “through-the-cycle” rating methodology (see, e.g., 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Crouhy et al. (2001), 
Altman and Rijken (2003)).  (5)
2.2.1  Bond Yield Spreads
The difference between the yield on a risky asset and an 
equivalent risk-free asset is often referred to as the bond 
yield spread. The risk-free rate is often proxied by the 
yield on a government bond or a swap contract. In the 
literature, it is standard to consider government bonds as 
default-free assets, given their relatively high liquidity and 
given that governments can in principle raise income by 
taxing their citizens, thereby avoiding default.
(3)  In this paper we consider rating migration risk, which represents the risk of an 
upgrading or downgrading of the rating of a ﬁ  nancial asset, as a part of default 
risk.
(4)  In what follows, the term “credit spread” covers bond yield spreads as well as 
CDS spreads.
(5)  The critique of rating agencies is mainly focused on the timeliness properties of 
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The bond yield spread compensates the investor for the 
expected default losses on the risky bond. No investor 
would be willing to buy a risky corporate bond, if he could 
buy a risk-free bond at the same price, ceteris paribus. 
Corporate bonds will trade at a lower price ceteris paribus 
and, hence, at a higher yield, since there is the risk of losing 
(part of) the invested funds. The spread also consists of a 
risk premium to reward the risk-averse investor for the risk 
of possibly higher than expected losses. As an illustration, 
consider the following example. Suppose that we have a 
risk-free bond with a price of 100 and a risky bond with 
exactly the same characteristics, except that it has a default 
probability of 10 p.c. A risk-neutral investor will pay 100 for 
the risk-free bond and 90 for the risky bond. A risk-averse 
investor will pay 100 for the risk-free bond but only less 
than 90 for the risky bond. The stronger the risk-aversion 
of an investor, the lower the price he is willing to pay (or 
the higher the premium) for the risky bond.
Finally, it is very likely that the spread between default-
risky and default-free yields also includes a premium 
for other factors such as liquidity risk, differences in tax 
treatments between government and corporate bonds, 
contingent contract speciﬁ  cations (e.g. call features) and 
systematics shocks.
2.2.2  Credit Default Swap (CDS) Spread
CDS is the most used credit derivative and can be viewed 
as default insurance on loans or bonds. The buyer of a 
CDS makes periodic payments to the seller of the CDS 
and in return obtains the right to sell to the CDS seller 
a bond issued by the reference entity (company or 
sovereign) for its face value if default or another credit 
event occurs. Using CDS data to mesure spreads has two 
major advantages (see Hull et al. (2002) and Cossin et 
al. (2002)). First, CDS spread data provided by a broker 
consist of ﬁ  rm bid and offer quotes from dealers. Once 
a quote has been made, the dealer is committed to trad-
ing a minimum principal (usually 10  million dollars) at 
the quoted price. However, bond yield data available to 
researchers usually consist of indications from dealers. So, 
there is no commitment from the dealer to trade at the 
speciﬁ   ed price. Second, since CDS spreads are already 
credit spreads, there is no default-free benchmark needed 
to calculate the spreads. The main disadvantages of CDSs 
are their lack of liquidity and the absence of a (liquid) 
secondary market.
2.2.3   Relationship between CDS Spread and Bond Yield 
Spread
In theory, bond yield spreads should be closely related 
to CDS spreads. This is because of an arbitrage relation-
ship that exists between credit default swap spreads 
and credit spreads for a given reference entity (see 
Dufﬁ  e (1999), O’Kane and McAdie (2001), and Hull et 
al. (2002)). Suppose that an investor buys a T-year par 
bond with yield to maturity y issued by the reference 
entity. The investor can eliminate most of the default risk 
associated with the bond by buying a CDS at a spread 
(or rate) of yCDS. By arbitrage, y - yCDS should approxi-
mately equal the risk-free rate, rf. For y - yCDS < rf. short-
ing a risky bond, writing protection in the CDS market, 
and buying a risk-free bond would be proﬁ  table. Thus, 
this suggests that the credit spread should be equal to 
the CDS spread. The results of the empirical studies on 
the relationship between CDS spreads and bond yield 
depend on the choice of the default-free benchmark 
(see, e.g., Blanco et al. (2003), Longstaff et al. (2003) 
and Houweling and Vorst (2005)). Studies that use the 
swap rate as the default-free benchmark ﬁ  nd  bond 
yield spreads to be quite close to CDS spreads (Blanco 
et al. (2003)). Derivatives traders tend to work with the 
LIBOR zero curve (also called swap zero curve) as the 
benchmark because the LIBOR or swap rates closely 
correspond to the cost of capital of ﬁ  nancial  institu-
tions. However, studies that use the Treasury rate as the 
default-free benchmark ﬁ  nd signiﬁ  cant differences.
3.   Determinants of Credit Spreads
3.1 Theoretical  Framework
Credit risk models generally boil down to one of two 
distinct approaches  : structural, contingent-claim or ﬁ  rm-
value models and reduced-form models. The structural 
models, initiated by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton 
(1974), relate credit events to the ﬁ  rm’s value and capital 
structure. Default occurs if the value of the ﬁ  rm falls below 
a barrier. In these models, credit events are endogenous. 
In contrast, the reduced-form models specify the credit 
event as an exogenous, unpredictable, statistical event, 
governed by some hazard-rate process. Although the 
latter category of models is used more often in pric-
ing derivatives for reasons of mathematical tractability, 
structural credit risk models yield more insight into the 
determinants of credit spreads. Since the Merton model 
(see Box 1  : Merton model) is one of the ﬁ  rst structural 
credit risk models, the literature often refers to it as the 
representative of the structural models.  (6)
(6)  The Merton model has been extended in several ways by relaxing some restrictive 
assumptions such as a deterministic risk-free term structure, zero-coupon debt as 
the only source of debt, and frictionless markets. However, the main conclusions 
are not altered by these extensions.139
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Box 1  – Merton  model
In the structural models, default occurs when the ﬁ  rm’s asset value, VT, falls below a speciﬁ  ed critical value at 
maturity T. In the Merton model (1974), the critical value is given by the face value of the ﬁ  rm’s zerobond debt, 
L, which is by assumption the only source of debt. In case of default, debt holders receive the amount VT. The 
value of a default-risky zero-coupon bond at time T can be written as
Eq 1
The value of a default-risky zero-coupon bond equals the difference of the value of a default-free zero-coupon 
bond with face value L and the value of European put option written on the ﬁ  rm’s asset value, with strike price L 
and exercise date T.(1) The payoff, L - VT, is often called the put-to-default.
In the Merton model, the dynamics of the asset value of the ﬁ  rm can be described as
Eq 2
where r is the instantaneous expected rate of return, the variance of the return  V σ  the underlying assets, and Zt 
a standard Wiener process.(2)
Since the sum of the ﬁ  rm’s debt value and equity value equals VT, the equity value at time T equals
Eq 3
The stockholders receive the difference between VT and L in the case of no default and zero in the case of default. 
The ﬁ  rm’s equity value can thus be seen as the value of a call option on the ﬁ  rm’s assets. Issuing debt is similar to 
selling the ﬁ  rm’s asset value to the bondholders while the stockholders keep a call option to buy back the assets. 
Using the put-call parity, this is equivalent to saying that the stockholders own the ﬁ  rm’s asset value and buy a 
put option from the bondholders.
Merton (1974) derived a closed-form solution for the price/yield of a defaultable zero-coupon bond by combining 
equation (1) with the Black and Scholes formula for a European put option. The credit spread on a defaultable 
bond with maturity T, CR(t,T) is calculated as the difference between the yield on a defaultable zero-coupon bond 
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The Merton model, which is discussed in more detail in 
the Box, and the structural credit risk models in general, 
provide a framework which identiﬁ  es  some  important 
determinants of credit spreads, which include the risk-
free interest rate, the asset value, and asset volatility. 
These variables are discussed in more detail below. In 
addition, we also discuss the slope of the default-free 
term structure, as this variable is implied by the structural 
models because it is closely related to the risk-free interest 
rate. Finally, we discuss two additional variables that do 
not come from the existing structural credit risk models 
but which are often mentioned in the literature on credit 
spreads : liquidity risk and taxation.
3.2   Factors Implied by Structural Credit Risk Models
3.2.1 Default-free  Interest  Rate
According to the structural credit risk models, we expect 
a negative relation between the (instantaneous) nominal 
risk-free rate and the credit spread.  (7) The drift of the risk-
neutral process of the value of the assets (see equation 
(2)), which is the expected growth of the ﬁ  rm’s value, 
equals the risk-free interest rate. An increase in the inter-
est rate implies an increase in the expected growth rate 
of the ﬁ  rm value. This will in turn lower the probability of 
default and the credit spread. Structural credit risk models 
show that for ﬁ  rms with moderate and high (low) debt 
levels, the effect of an interest rate change decreases 
(increases) with the term to maturity. However, the inter-
est rate effect always remains stronger for ﬁ  rms  with 
higher debt levels. Since ﬁ  rms with a higher debt level 
often have a lower rating, we expect that the interest rate 
effect is stronger for lower rated ﬁ  rms.
Furthermore, lower interest rates are usually associated 
with a weakening economy and higher credit spreads. In 
the long run, however, low interest rates might stimulate 
investment and thus economic growth. This reasoning 
would lead, in contrast to what was said above, to a posi-
tive relation between the risk-free rate and credit spreads. 
Box 2 discusses which relation arises empirically.
3.2.2  Slope of Default-free Term Structure
The interpretation of the effect of the slope of the 
default-free term structure on credit spreads is similar to 
that of the effect of the default-free rate. The expecta-
tions hypothesis of the term structure implies that the 
spread between the long-term and the short-term rate, 
which is often called the slope, is an optimal predictor 
of future changes in short-term rates over the life of the 
long-term bond. As such, an increase in the slope implies 
an increase in the expected short-term interest rates. As 
in the case of the motivation for the risk-free interest rate 
above, an increase in the slope is expected to lower the 
price of the put option and reduce a ﬁ  rm’s default risk. 
Furthermore, the slope of the term structure is often 
related to future business cycle conditions. A decrease in 
the slope is considered to be an indication of a weaken-
ing economy. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and Estrella 
and Mishkin (1995, 1998) conclude that the yield curve 
is a good predictor of future economic activity and the 
probability of recession. A positively sloped yield curve is 
associated with improving economic activity, which might 
in turn increase a ﬁ  rm’s growth rate and reduce its default 
probability. Therefore, we also expect a negative depend-
ence between changes in the slope of the default-free 
term structure and credit spread changes.
3.2.3 Asset  Price
Equation (4) includes the leverage ratio or the pseudo 
debt-to-assets ratio, namely l.  (8) Firms with a low lever-
age ratio, where the asset value can easily cover the debt 
value, are unlikely to default. An increase in the leverage 
ratio increases the value of the put option and thus the 
credit spread. An increase in the ﬁ  rm’s asset value, V, (for 
a given debt value) reduces the leverage ratio and the 
value of the put option. Therefore, we expect a nega-
tive relation between the ﬁ  rm’s asset value and the credit 
spread. The effect of an asset price change is stronger for 
N denotes the cumulative probability distribution function of a standard normal. Lt = LB(t, T) is the present value 
of the promised claim (the face value) at the maturity of the bond and B (t, T) presents the value of a unit default-
free zero-coupon bond. l is the leverage ratio, r the continuously compounded risk-free rate and  V σ  the volatility 
of the ﬁ  rm’s asset value. For simplicity, we assume that the payout or dividend ratio equals zero.
Equation (4) shows that the credit spread is a function of the risk-free interest rate, the ﬁ  rm’s asset value, and the 
volatility of the ﬁ  rm’s asset value. These factors will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.
(7)  The risk-free rate that is referred to in the structural credit risk models is the 
nominal rate. In the remainder, we drop “nominal”.
(8)  Structural credit risk models often refer to the distance-to-default ratio, which is 
(1/l) (with l the leverage ratio).141
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bonds with a short to medium term to maturity and for 
ﬁ  rms with a high leverage ratio.
Structural models typically assume that the assets of the 
ﬁ  rm are tradable securities. In practice, however, the asset 
value has to be deduced from the balance sheet and is 
updated only on an infrequent basis. Therefore, the value 
of the assets is usually replaced by the equity value/returns 
for publicly traded companies. Studies that consider port-
folios of bonds try to mimic the average stock return of 
the issuing ﬁ  rms by including the value (return) of a stock 
index that is related to the portfolio. For a portfolio of, 
e.g., Euro bonds issued by the ﬁ  nancial sector, the aver-
age asset value is often proxied by the return of a Euro 
ﬁ  nancial index.
3.2.4 Asset  Volatility
Equation (4) shows that credit spreads are affected by the 
volatility of the ﬁ  rm’s asset value. High asset volatility cor-
responds with a high probability that the ﬁ  rm’s asset value 
will fall below the value of its debt. In that case, it is more 
likely that the put option will be exercised and thus, credit 
spreads will be higher. The effect of a volatility increase 
is larger for bonds with a high leverage ratio compared 
to bonds whose debt value is far below the asset value. 
Furthermore, the effect decreases with the time to matu-
rity for bonds with a high leverage ratio. For bonds with 
a low leverage ratio, the effect ﬁ  rst increases slightly and 
then remains constant.
Since the asset value, and thus asset volatility, is only 
updated on an infrequent basis, asset volatility is often 
replaced by equity volatility. As with asset volatility, an 
increase in equity volatility increases the probability that 
the put option will be exercised and therefore credit 
spreads will increase. Studies that analyse portfolios of 
bonds often use the volatility of a stock index that is 
related to the portfolio.
3.3 Other  Factors
3.3.1 Liquidity  Risk
Option models typically used in the structural approach 
assume perfect and complete markets where trading 
takes place continuously. These assumptions imply no 
differences in liquidity between bonds. However, in 
practice markets are not perfectly liquid, and liquidity 
may be an important determinant of credit spreads. 
Indeed, Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Elton et al. (2001), 
Houweling et al. (2004), and Perraudin and Taylor (2004) 
ﬁ  nd evidence that liquidity signiﬁ  cantly inﬂ  uences credit 
spreads. Investors require a premium for investing in less 
liquid assets. If liquidity risk were similar for government 
and corporate bonds, the liquidity premium should be 
cancelled out when taking the difference between the 
two yields. However, since government bond markets 
are larger and more liquid than corporate bond markets, 
an investor may expect an additional premium for lower 
liquidity in corporate bond markets. Hence, we expect 
a positive relationship between liquidity risk and credit 
spreads. Measures that are often used as proxies for 
liquidity risk are the bid-ask spread, trading volume, age, 
and bond issue size.
3.3.2 Taxation  Differences
If taxation differences exist between corporate and gov-
ernment bonds or corporate bonds and swap contracts, 
bond yield spreads are likely to reﬂ  ect these differences. 
It is well known that US municipal bonds have had a 
negative credit spread for the last 50 years, despite their 
lower liquidity and higher default risk in comparison with 
government bonds. The reason is that municipal bond 
interest payments are exempt from US federal income 
taxes. Even though part of the level of credit spreads 
might reﬂ   ect the tax effect, it is very unlikely that the 
tax effect has a signiﬁ  cant impact on changes in credit 
spreads given the rigid nature of taxation rates.
4.   Detailed Empirical Analysis of Euro 
Credit Spreads
4.1 Introduction
This study, which is based on a Van Landschoot (2004), 
analyses the determinants of credit spread changes for 
different types of Euro corporate bonds between 1998 
and 2002. More speciﬁ  cally, we investigate the relation-
ship between credit spread changes and ﬁ  nancial  and 
economic factors for bonds with different maturities and 
investment grade rating categories. The main question 
is whether credit spread changes on bonds with differ-
ent characteristics (rating and/or maturity) are differently 
affected by the various determinants of credit spreads. To 
our knowledge, this is the ﬁ  rst paper on credit spreads 
that tests these differences for a wide range of maturities 
and rating categories with a data set of individual Euro 
corporate bonds.142
4.2 Data  Description
The analysis uses individual weekly bond data of the 
EMU Broad Market indices from January  1998 until 
December 2002 constructed by Merrill Lynch. The data set 
consists of 1577 corporate bonds issued by 448 ﬁ  rms and 
250 AAA rated government bonds. The former are used 
to estimate the term structure of risky assets, whereas the 
latter are used to estimate the risk-free term structure. 
The EMU Broad Market indices are based on secondary 
market prices of bonds issued in the EMU bond market 
or in EMU-zone domestic markets and denominated in 
Euro or one of the currencies that joined the EMU. Besides 
bond prices, the data set contains data on the coupon 
rate, the time to maturity, the rating, the industry clas-
siﬁ  cation, and the amount issued. Ratings are composite 
Moody’s and Standard & Poors ratings. The Merrill Lynch 
Broad Market index covers investment-grade ﬁ  rms. Hence 
the analysis is restricted to corporate bonds rated BBB and 
higher. Further, all bonds have a ﬁ  xed rate coupon and 
pay annual coupons. To be included in the Merrill Lynch 
index, bonds should have a minimum size of 100 million 
euro for corporate bonds and 1 billion euro for govern-
ment bonds. Because the EMU Broad Market index has 
relatively low minimum size requirements, it provides a 
broad coverage of the underlying markets.
4.3  Term Structure of Credit Spreads
In accordance with the structural credit risk models, 
we expect that the relation between credit spreads and 
macro-economic and ﬁ  nancial variables depends on the 
leverage ratio (creditworthiness) of the issuer and the 
maturity of the bonds. In accordance with the existing 
empirical literature on credit spreads, we use credit rat-
ings as a proxy for the leverage of the issuing ﬁ  rm. In 
order to obtain and easily compare credit spreads for a 
broad range of maturities and ratings, we estimate the 
term structure of credit spreads for four groups of bonds, 
namely AAA, AA, A, and BBB rated bonds. The term 
structure of credit spreads is calculated as the difference 
between the term structure of spot rates on corporate 
and government bonds.  (9) The term structure gives the 
evolution of credit spreads as a function of the remaining 
time to maturity of the bonds. Since spot rates are not 
observable, we use an extension of the parametric model 
introduced by Nelson and Siegel (1987). This Nelson-
Siegel (NS) model offers a conceptually simple and 
parsimonious description of the term structure of inter-
est rates. It avoids over-parameterisation while it allows 
for monotonically increasing or decreasing yield curves 
and hump shaped yield curves. Diebold and Li (2002) 
conclude that the NS method produces one-year-ahead 
forecasts that are strikingly more accurate than standard 
benchmarks such as linear interpolation.
We add four additional factors to the original NS model 
in order to capture differences in liquidity, taxation, and 
subrating categories. First, if liquidity decreases, bid-ask 
spreads tend to widen and hence spot rates might go up. 
Second, to capture part of the taxation effect, we include 
the difference between the coupon of a bond and the 
(9)  There are a number of reasons for using the spot rates instead of yields to 
maturity. The yield to maturity depends on the coupon rate. The yield to maturity 
of bonds with the same maturity but different coupons may vary considerably. As 
such, the credit spread will depend on the coupon rate. Furthermore, if we use 
yields to maturity to calculate the credit spread, we compare bonds with different 
duration and convexity.
TABLE 1 AVERAGE CREDIT SPREADS ON BONDS WITH DIFFERENT RATINGS AND MATURITIES
Note: The table presents average and standard deviation (between brackets) of credit spreads on AAA, AA, A, and BBB rated bonds with different maturities. We use a data set 
of weekly data from January 1998 until December 2002.
Rating Years to maturity
3y 5y 7y 10y
AAA   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.0 (3.4) 18.3 (6.7) 22.0 (9.0) 26.0 (11.0)
AA+   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.6 (4.3) 27.2 (7.7) 32.8 (10.2) 38.6 (11.6)
AA    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.0 (4.8) 31.6 (8.6) 37.2 (11.3) 43.0 (12.9)
AA–   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.1 (8.5) 41.7 (12.4) 47.3 (14.9) 53.1 (16.6)
A+     . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.6 (9.9) 50.9 (15.1) 59.0 (18.1) 67.5 (20.4)
A      . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.4 (17.6) 66.8 (22.8) 74.9 (25.4) 83.4 (27.4)
A–     . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80.6 (32.0) 89.9 (36.7) 98.0 (38.8) 106.5 (40.5)
BBB+  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104.1 (27.0) 117.8 (31.2) 135.7 (30.4) 162.9 (31.1)
BBB / BBB–  . . . . . . . . . . . 154.2 (38.6) 167.9 (43.1) 185.8 (42.2) 213.0 (41.9)143
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average coupon rate of the sample. The underlying idea 
is that holders of high-coupon bonds need to pay more 
taxes compared to holders of low-coupon bonds. Finally, 
another reason why bonds might have different yields 
within a rating category is that they are not viewed as 
equally risky. Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s (S&P) both 
introduced subcategories within a rating category. While 
S&P add a plus (+) or a minus (–) sign, Moody’s adds a 
number (1, 2 or 3) to show the standing within the major 
rating categories. Bonds that are rated with a plus (1) or a 
minus (3) might be considered as having a different prob-
ability of default compared to the ﬂ  at letter rating (2). 
Therefore, we include a dummy for the plus subcategory 
and a dummy for the minus subcategory.  (10)
Table 1 presents the summary statistics (average and 
standard deviation) of credit spreads on bonds with 
different ratings and maturities. The results show the 
well-known fact that credit spreads increase as the cre-
ditworthiness of the issuer decreases. Furthermore, credit 
spread volatility (standard deviation) is higher for bonds 
with lower ratings. Finally, credit spreads are higher for 
bonds with longer maturities.
4.4 Model  Speciﬁ  cation
We investigate the main factors driving credit spread 
changes on bonds with different characteristics, in 
particular ratings and maturities. The structural models 
provide guidance on identiﬁ  cation of the main factors, 
namely the level and the slope of the default-free term 
structure, the stock return, and the volatility of stock 
prices. Furthermore, we also consider liquidity risk, meas-
ured as the bid-ask spread, and mean-reverting properties 
of credit spreads.
In order to analyse the main determinants of credit spread 
changes of bonds in rating category j and with years to 
maturity m, we estimate the following equation
Eq 5
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where CR is the estimated credit spread for a rating group 
(AAA, AA, A, and BBB).  (11) The variables i3 and slope are 
the level and the slope of the default-free term structure, 
respectively. The former is deﬁ  ned as the 3-month euro 
rate and the latter as the spread between the 10-year 
constant maturity euro government bond yield minus 
the 3-month euro rate. Rm and vol are the market return 
and volatility of the DJ Euro Stoxx. These variables should 
proxy the asset value of the issuing ﬁ  rm and its volatility 
(see Section 3.1.1). In a manner similar to Bekaert and Wu 
(2000) and Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), we test whether 
the impact of volatility is asymmetric. Therefore, we make 
a distinction between positive (volp) and negative changes 
in the volatility (voln). The variable liq is a proxy for 
liquidity risk, namely the average bid-ask spread of the 
bonds in our sample. We include the lagged level and the 
change in the bid-ask spread. Given the fact that bid-ask 
spreads are very small, the level might be more important 
than a change.
Finally,  CR CRt − − 1 = MR  is the deviation of the credit spread 
from its mean. This factor should capture the mean-rever-
sion of credit spreads. If credit spreads ﬂ  uctuate around 
a long-term average (equilibrium), the sensitivity to the 
lagged credit spread should be negative. Table 2 gives an 
overview of the explanatory variables and the expected 
signs on the coefﬁ  cients.
Weekly data on the explanatory variables are obtained 
from Datastream and Bloomberg. We estimate the credit 
spread model using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
methodology. This methodology has the advantage that 
it accounts for heteroskedasticity, and contemporaneous 
correlation in the errors across equations. Furthermore, 
we are able to test for signiﬁ  cant differences in sensitivity 
coefﬁ  cients for bonds with different maturities.
(10)  For simplicity, we assume that the additional factors only affect the level of the 
term structure and not the slope.
(11)  CR is the credit spread that results from the term structure estimation. It can be 
considered as an weighted average of the credit spreads in that rating category.
TABLE 2 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AND EXPECTED SIGNS 




  . . . . . . . . . . . . . Change in 3 month euro rate –
   . . . . . . . . . . Change in slope, i.e. 10 year 
minus 3 month euro rate –
   . . . . . . . . . . . . Weekly return on DJ Euro 
Stoxx, lagged one week –
   . . . . . . . . . . . Positive change in volatility 
of DJ Euro Stoxx +
  . . . . . . . . . . . Negative change in volatility 
of DJ Euro Stoxx +
  . . . . . . . . . . . . Bid-ask spread, lagged one 
period +
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . Change in bid-ask spread +
   . . Credit spread minus average 
credit spread (mean reversion 
term) –






1 − t liq
t liq ∆
CR CRt − − 1 = MR144
4.5 Empirical  Results
Panels A, B, C, and D of Table 3 present the estimation 
results for bonds with different rating categories (AAA, 
AA, A, and BBB) and different maturities (3, 5, 7, and 
10 years to maturity). The sensitivities of credit spreads on 
bonds with similar rating, e.g. AA, but different subrating, 
e.g. AA+, AA, and AA–, are very similar. Therefore, we 
focus on different ratings and not subratings. We perform 
Wald tests to analyse whether bonds with different matu-
rities and/or ratings react in signiﬁ  cantly different ways to 
changes in ﬁ  nancial and macro-economic variables.(12)
The results show that changes in the level and the slope of 
the default-free term structure are two important deter-
minants of credit spread changes. Consistent with the 
ﬁ  ndings of Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Duffee (1998), 
and Collin-Dufresne (2001) for the US and for Boss and 
Scheicher (2002) and Leake (2003) for Europe, we ﬁ  nd a 
negative relation between changes in the level and the 
slope of the default-free term structure and credit spread 
changes. For AAA and AA bonds, the null hypothesis that 
the sensitivities in credit spread changes are similar for 
different maturities is rejected for both the level and the 
slope. The effects ﬁ  rst increase with the time to maturity 
and then decrease. However, for A and BBB rated bonds 
the effects do not signiﬁ  cantly depend on the maturity. 
Furthermore, the level effect is stronger for bonds with a 
lower rating or high leverage ratios. This is in accordance 
with the implications of structural credit risk models (see 
Section 3.1.1). However, the slope effect is very similar 
for AAA, AA, and A rated bonds. For BBB rated bonds, 
the slope effect is substantially larger. If we compare the 
level effect on credit spreads of, e.g., AAA and BBB rated 
bonds with 7 years to maturity, we ﬁ  nd that a 100 basis 
point increase in the 3-month risk-free rate causes a 
5.6 basis point decrease in the AAA credit spread and a 
32.4 basis point decrease in the BBB credit spread.
The return and the implied volatility of DJ Euro Stoxx sig-
niﬁ  cantly inﬂ  uence credit spread changes. According to 
the structural credit risk models, the effects of the return 
and volatility should be larger for bonds with a higher 
leverage. The results indeed indicate that the sensitivity 
coefﬁ   cients are higher for BBB rated bonds compared 
to AAA rated bonds. A 100 basis point increase of the 
weekly market return reduces the credit spread on AAA 
and BBB rated bonds with 7 years to maturity by 0.08 and 
0.7 basis points respectively. The return effect is relatively 
weak compared to the effect of the level and the slope 
of the default-free term structure. For AA, A, and BBB 
rated bonds, we ﬁ  nd that positive changes in the volatility 
signiﬁ  cantly  inﬂ  uence  credit  spread  changes  whereas 
negative changes do not. This is in accordance with the 
hypothesis that the effect of the volatility is asymmetric. 
For AAA, the results are less clear. Furthermore, Wald tests 
show that the effect of the return and the volatility do 
not depend on the maturity of the bonds. This can not be 
explained by the theoretical models that predict a stronger 
effect for bonds with a shorter maturity.
For AAA, AA, and A rated bonds, we ﬁ  nd that the bid-
ask spread signiﬁ  cantly inﬂ  uences credit spread changes. 
However, changes in the bid-ask spread do not have a 
signiﬁ  cant  inﬂ   uence. This shows that the credit spread 
changes are more affected by the bid-ask spread itself 
than a change in the bid-ask spread. For BBB rated bonds, 
the level as well as the changes in the bid-ask spread sig-
niﬁ   cantly affect credit spread changes. In general, the 
effect of the bid-ask spread becomes stronger for bonds 
with a lower rating. An increase of 100 basis points in 
the bid-ask spread increases the credit spread on AAA 
(BBB) rated corporate bonds with 7 years to maturity by 
23 (164) basis points. For AAA and AA rated bonds, the 
effect of the bid-ask spread becomes stronger for bonds 
with longer maturities. For higher rating categories, 
liquidity changes do not signiﬁ  cantly affect credit spread 
changes. This might be due to the fact that these bonds 
are more liquid than BBB rated bonds and are not imme-
diately affected by a change.
Finally, our results indicate that credit spreads are mean 
reverting. This means that if credit spreads are high, the 
changes are smaller or even negative such that the credit 
spread converges to its long-run average.
The factors suggested by the structural credit risk models 
explain between 10 p.c. and 39 p.c. of the evolution of 
credit spread changes, depending on the rating category 
and the maturity of the bond. The economic and ﬁ  nancial 
variables included in our model (see Equation 5) have 
the highest explanatory power for BBB rated bonds. 
Furthermore, our model explains most of the variation 
of credit spreads on bonds with medium maturities. The 
adjusted R2 is on average 19 p.c. for bonds with 3 and 
10  years to maturity and 24  p.c. for bonds with 5  and 
7 years to maturity. Our results indicate that bonds with 
different ratings and maturities behave differently.
(12)  The results of the Wald test and a more detailed discussion of the results can be 
found in Van Landschoot (2004).  145
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TABLE 3 DETERMINANTS OF CREDIT SPREAD CHANGES: ESTIMATION RESULTS
Note: Panel A, B, C, and D present the estimation results for credit spreads on respectively AAA, AA, A, and BBB rated bonds. The data set consists of weekly data from January 
1998 until December 2002. The explanatory variables are briefly explained in Table 2. The model is estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). p-values are 
given between brackets. Coefficients that are significant at 5 p.c. level are in bold. The adjusted   in the final column are given in p.c.
Panel A: AAA rated bonds
3 yr –6.29 –6.80 –0.04 0.05 0.00 0.16 0.21 –0.11 24.4
(0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.25) (0.91) (0.01) (0.57) (0.00)
5 yr –8.31 –9.04 –0.06 0.08 –0.02 0.25 0.39 –0.10 33.7
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.66) (0.00) (0.24) (0.00)
7 yr –5.98 –8.15 –0.08 0.08 0.04 0.23 0.31 –0.09 24.3
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.41) (0.00) (0.38) (0.00)
10 yr 0.53 –4.99 –0.10 0.06 0.14 0.18 –0.05 –0.08 11.4
(0.79) (0.00) (0.00) (0.29) (0.01) (0.03) (0.91) (0.00)
Panel B: AA rated bonds
3 yr –5.86 –6.11 –0.04 0.13 0.02 0.45 0.99 –0.11 21.7
(0.00) (0.00) (0.24) (0.02) (0.74) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
5 yr –5.04 –6.65 –0.09 0.15 0.03 0.48 0.77 –0.10 25.1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.53) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00)
7 yr –2.79 –5.68 –0.13 0.16 0.04 0.43 0.52 –0.10 20.3
(0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.21) (0.00)
10 yr 1.25 –3.15 –0.18 0.13 0.04 0.41 0.49 –0.10 10.2
(0.56) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.52) (0.00) (0.35) (0.00)
Panel C: A rated bonds
3 yr –10.60 –5.34 –0.14 0.31 0.07 0.91 1.04 –0.10 13.6
(0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.47) (0.00) (0.27) (0.00)
5 yr –12.62 –9.61 –0.13 0.29 0.10 0.95 1.64 –0.09 15.2
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.37) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00)
7 yr –10.67 –9.50 –0.19 0.29 0.07 0.80 1.64 –0.08 15.1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.48) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00)
10 yr –4.89 –5.18 –0.33 0.41 0.02 0.60 1.06 –0.07 17.4
(0.17) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.85) (0.00) (0.25) (0.00)
Panel D: BBB rated bonds
3 yr –14.54 –14.24 –0.67 0.59 –0.22 1.85 4.33 –0.18 17.4
(0.21) (0.08) (0.00) (0.02) (0.40) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
5 yr –23.05 –21.39 –0.67 0.82 –0.38 1.97 5.56 –0.18 20.1
(0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
7 yr –33.07 –32.27 –0.74 1.08 0.00 1.64 8.43 –0.17 32.5
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.99) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
10 yr –52.42 –44.30 –0.88 1.62 0.71 0.89 11.57 –0.16 38.9
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.15) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00)
3 i ∆ slope ∆ m R ∆ volp ∆ voln liq ∆ liq MR R2
R2
5.   Comparison of European Versus Us 
Credit Spreads
As the US has a large and mature corporate bond market, 
most empirical studies on corporate credit spreads have 
concentrated on US data (Duffee (1998), Collin-Dufresne 
et al. (2001), Cossin et al. (2002), Elton et al (2001), and 
others). Empirical studies on the determinants of European 
credit spreads are rather limited (Boss and Scheicher 
(2002), Leake (2003), and Van Landschoot (2004)). 
An issue of interest is whether credit spreads on US 
corporate bonds are affected by the same factors and in a 
similar way as those on European corporate bonds. Chart 
1 shows that the size of the Euro corporate bond market 
has become large enough (over the last decade) to make 
a comparison.(13) Furthermore, we consider whether bond 
characteristics such as maturity and leverage inﬂ  uence the 
relation between credit spreads and macro-economic and 
(13)  Before the EMU, the Euro corporate bond market was very small and illiquid. 
Therefore, it is very difﬁ  cult (if not impossible) to investigate the effect of the 
formation of the EMU on the relation between credit spreads and macro-
economic and ﬁ  nancial variables. 146
ﬁ  nancial variables in a similar way for the US and Europe. 
The leverage is often proxied by the rating.
In this section, we review studies that proxy the credit 
spread by the bond yield spread and not the CDS spread.(14)
The reason is that the CDS market is much less developed 
than the corporate bond market. Furthermore, we focus 
on studies that analyse the determinants of credit spread 
changes instead of levels. The reason is threefold. First, 
even though it seems implausible that any credit spread 
would actually explode, as a unit root process could, 
credit spreads are highly persistent. This may result in 
biased estimates (see Ferson et al. (2003) for a detailed 
analysis of spurious regression bias). Second, the holder 
of a default-risky asset is mainly interested in the changes 
in the credit spread. Third, focusing only on credit spread 
changes makes it easier to compare the magnitude of the 
sensitivity coefﬁ  cients.
5.1   Empirical Evidence on the Determinants of 
Credit Spreads
For the US, we brieﬂ  y discuss and compare the results   
of Longstaff and Schwartz (1996), Duffee (1998), and   
Collin-Dufresne (2001). For Europe, we brieﬂ  y  discuss 
and compare the results of Boss and Scheicher (2002), 
Leake (2002), and Van Landschoot (2004). Longstaff 
and Schwartz (1996), Duffee (1998), and Leake (2002) 
mainly focus on the relation between the risk-free term 
structure and credit spreads, whereas the others attempt 
to explain as much as possible of the variation of credit 
spreads. Table 4 gives an overview of the main variables 
that are included in the different studies and the sign of 
the sensitivity coefﬁ  cients.
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) investigate the relationship 
between interest rate changes and credit spread changes 
on investment grade US indices for different sectors (utili-
ties, industrials, and railroads) and investment grade rat-
ings between 1977 and 1992. The authors do not make 
a distinction between bonds with different maturities. 
The results show a signiﬁ  cant negative relation between 
credit spread changes and 30-year Treasury yield changes 
for all sectors. The effect is stronger for industrials and 
railroads compared to utilities. Although the authors do 
not discuss this issue, the results seem to indicate that the 
effect is stronger for lower rated bonds. Furthermore, they 
ﬁ  nd a signiﬁ  cant negative relation between credit spread 
changes and the return on the corresponding S&P stock 
index. The latter effect monotonically declines with the 
credit rating for utilities and industrials. The regression 
results show that a 100 basis point increase in the 30-year 
(14)  Cossin et al. (2002) is one of the few studies analysing the determinants of CDS 
spreads.
TABLE 4 OVERVIEW OF THE DETERMINANTS OF CREDIT SPREAD CHANGES
Note: This table presents an overview of the determinants (see below) of credit spread changes i = interest rate; slope = slope of the default-free term structure; volint = interest 
rate volatility;   = market return; vol = equity volatility; liq = proxy for liquidity; SMB = Small minus Big (Fama-French factor); HML = High minus Low (Fama-French 
factor); MR = mean reversion (lagged level). We mention the sign of the coefficient: positive (+), negative (–) or zero (0). If the coefficient is significant at the 5 p.c. level, 
it is presented in bold. All studies in Table 5, except Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), include  I lagged one period instead of  . The adjusted   in the final column is 
given in p.c.
(1) Only financials.
Panel A: US data
Longstaff & Schwartz 
(1995)  . . . . . . . . . (–) (+) 41
Duffee (1998)  . . . . . (–)( –) 42
Morris et al. (1998) (–) 30
Joutz et al. (2002) . . (–)( –)( –)( –)( –)2 9
Collin-Dufresne et al. 
(2001)  . . . . . . . . . (–)( –)( –)( –) (+) (+) (–)( –)( –)2 5
Panel B: European data
Boss & Scheicher 
(2002)  . . . . . . . . . (–)( –) (+) (–) (+) (1) (+) 40
Leake (2003)  . . . . . . (–)( –) 7
Van Landschoot 
(2003)  . . . . . . . . . (–)( –)( –) (+) (+) (–)2 3
i ∆ (∆ i)2 slope ∆ ∆ volint
m R ∆ vol liq SMB HML MR 2 R
m R
m R
m R 2 R147
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Treasury yield and a 100 basis points return reduces Baa 
rated utility credit spreads by 18 basis points and 1.6 basis 
points respectively. The paper does not test whether the 
sensitivity coefﬁ  cients differ signiﬁ  cantly between differ-
ent types of bonds. Their two-factor model explains on 
average 41 p.c. of the variation in credit spreads, with a 
minimum of 1.1 p.c. for Baa utilities and a maximum of 
74 p.c. for Baa railroads.
Duffee (1998) analyses the relationship between changes 
in corporate bond yield spreads and changes in the Treasury 
yields. This study uses a data set of monthly US callable 
and noncallable investment grade corporate bonds (1973-
1995) and constructs indices for different rating categories 
and three maturity ranges. The results provide evidence 
that changes in the level and the slope of the term struc-
ture are negatively related to credit spread changes. The 
magnitude of the latter coefﬁ   cient becomes larger for 
lower rated bonds and longer maturities. The regression 
results show that an increase of 100 basis points in the 
3-month risk-free rate and the slope (10-year minus 
3-month risk-free rate) reduce the AA long maturity credit 
spread by 29 basis points. However, the results do not 
show whether the maturity signiﬁ  cantly affects the rela-
tion. The authors also conclude that there is no compelling 
evidence that yield spreads for different business sectors 
react differently to Treasury yields and that the inverse rela-
tionship between corporate bond yields and the Treasury 
bill yield is much stronger for callable bonds. Duffee’s two-
factor model is able to explain 42 p.c. of the variation in 
credit spreads.
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) analyse the determinants of 
credit spread changes using a panel data set of individual 
monthly US industrial bond data (1988-1997) for rating 
categories (AAA to B) and two maturity categories. The 
sensitivity coefﬁ   cients to changes in the level and the 
slope of the default-free term structure, the S&P return, 
changes in the S&P volatility, and liquidity proxies all have 
the expected sign and are signiﬁ  cant. Although they do 
not ﬁ  nd signiﬁ  cant differences between bonds with dif-
ferent ratings and maturities, their model performs worst 
when explaining variations in long-term, high-leveraged 
bonds. Including other ﬁ  nancial and economic variables 
such as liquidity proxies, Fama-French factors (small-
minus-big (SMB) and high-minus-low (HML)), and lever-
age provide only limited additional explanatory power.(15) 
Furthermore, they ﬁ  nd that, contrary to the predictions of 
the structural models, aggregate factors are much more 
important than ﬁ  rm-speciﬁ  c factors.
Boss and Scheicher  (2002) analyse the determinants of 
credit spread changes on Euro corporate bonds (ﬁ  nancials 
and industrials) and on US corporate bonds (industrials). 
They ﬁ  nd that the level and the slope of the default-free 
term structure are the most important determinants of 
credit spread changes. In addition, stock returns and 
implied volatility of stock returns have the expected sign 
and signiﬁ  cantly affect credit spread changes for industri-
als. Liquidity proxies are not signiﬁ  cant at a 5 p.c. level. The 
results for US credit spread changes are very similar to those 
for Euro credit spread changes, except that the former are 
also affected by liquidity changes. The model explains on 
average 35 p.c of the variation in credit spread changes.
Leake (2003) analyses the relation between credit spread 
changes on sterling corporate bonds and the term struc-
ture of UK interest rates. Using weekly data, they ﬁ  nd a 
signiﬁ  cant negative relation between changes in the level 
and the slope of the risk-free UK term structure and credit 
spread changes. Credit spreads fall by between 5 and 
16 basis points for a 100 basis points rise in the level or the 
slope (over a period of one week). Their model explains on 
average 7 p.c. of the variation in credit spread changes.
Box 2  –   Relation between Credit Spreads and the Risk-Free Interest Rate over 
Time
Theoretical credit risk models, explicitly or implicitly, include a relation between credit spreads and the risk-free 
rate. The Merton type credit risk models posit a negative relation between credit spreads and the risk-free rate (see 
Black and Cox (1976), Leland (1994), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Zhou (1997), and others).(1) Recent empirical 
studies of Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Duffee (1998), and Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) also ﬁ  nd evidence of 
a negative relation between credit spread changes and changes in the risk-free rate.
(15)  Fama and French (1993) ﬁ  nd that HML and SMB, which are also called Fama-
French factors, signiﬁ  cantly affect stock returns. HML is the return on high 
minus low capitalization portfolios and SMB is the return on small minus big 
book-to-market portfolios. HML and SMB are assumed to capture the risk 
related to size and book-to-market ratio. See Fama and French (1993) for a 
detailed overview.
!
(1)  See Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 for a discussion on the relation between credit spreads and the risk-free rate according to the Merton type credit risk models.148
Morris et al. (1998) and Joutz et al. (2002) argue that the ﬁ  nding of a negative relation between credit spreads and 
the risk-free rate is due to the fact that studies analysing credit spread changes automatically focus on the short-
term relation. Both studies use a data set of US corporate bonds and apply a cointegration approach to model the 
long run and short-run relations between credit spreads and Treasury rates. They ﬁ  nd that, initially, an increase in 
the Treasury rate causes credit spreads to narrow, which is in accordance with the structural credit risk models. 
However, this effect is reversed in the long run with higher rates causing increasing credit spreads. In the short 
run, a decrease of the risk-free interest rate is usually associated with a weakening economy and thus high credit 
spreads. However, a low-interest rate-environment is likely to stimulate investment and economic growth and to 
lower credit spreads after some time. Morris et al. (1998) only focus on the risk-free rate as an explanatory variable 
and ﬁ  nd that their model explains on average 30 p.c. of the variation in credit spreads on Moody’s investment 
grade bond indices (Jan. 1960 - Dec. 1997). Joutz et al. (2002) also ﬁ  nd that credit spread changes are signiﬁ  cantly 
negatively related to changes in the level and the slope of the default-free term structure. Furthermore, they ﬁ  nd 
that the market return, small-minus-big (SMB), and high-minus-low (HML) are signiﬁ  cantly negatively related to 
credit spread changes. Similar studies for the Euro corporate bond market have not been undertaken because the 
latter has a much shorter history compared to the US corporate bond market.
Chart 1 presents the credit spread on US corporate bonds and US 3 months Treasury Rate. It shows that the US 
credit spread often lags the US Treasury rate, which is in accordance with the long-run relation discussed in Morris 
et al. (1998) and Joutz et al. (2002). Decreases in the Treasury rate at the end of 1980, the beginning of 1990, 
and the beginning of 2000 are followed by decreases in the credit spread (with a lag of one year). However, an 
increase in the Treasury rate in 1994 was not followed by an increase in the credit spreads. Chart 1 also shows 
that in the short run an increase in the Treasury rate often coincides with a decrease in the credit spread. For the 
Euro area, the history of the Euro corporate bond market is too short to draw (strong) conclusions, especially for 






















































CHART 1  US CREDIT SPREADS AND SHORT TERM 
INTERREST RATE 
Source : Bloomberg (Merrill Lynch) and Datastream.
(1)  Calculated as the difference beween the US corporate and governement bond 
yield (all maturities).
US credit spread (left-hand scale) (1)














































THE DETERMINANTS OF CREDIT SPREADS
5.2  Comparison of European and US Credit Spreads
We now compare ﬁ  ndings for the US and Europe based 
on the empirical results in Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), 
Duffee (1998), and Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) for the 
US and Boss and Scheicher (2002), Leake (2003), and Van 
Landschoot (2004) for Europe. Notice that not all stud-
ies focus on the same variables. Therefore, “all studies” 
means those studies that focus on a particular variable or 
relation.
1. There is a signiﬁ  cant negative relation between credit 
spread changes on European and US corporate bonds 
and changes in the European and US risk-free rate, 
respectively. In general, the effect becomes stronger 
for bonds with a lower rating (higher leverage).
2.  For the slope effect, all studies ﬁ  nd  a  signiﬁ  cant 
negative relation between credit spread changes and 
changes in the slope of the default-free term structure. 
Most studies provide evidence that the slope effect 
slightly increases for lower ratings.
3. It is unclear whether the effect of changes in the 
risk-free rate and the slope of the default-free term 
structure depend on the maturity of the bonds. Duffee 
(1998) and Van Landschoot (2004) ﬁ  nd that the effects 
are smaller for bonds with shorter maturities, whereas 
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) do not ﬁ  nd different sen-
sitivity coefﬁ  cients for bonds with short and long term 
maturities.
4. In general, the sensitivity of credit spreads to changes 
in the level and the slope of the default-free term 
structure do not differ signiﬁ  cantly  between  studies 
on US and European credit spreads, i.e. the sensitivity 
coefﬁ  cients are not persistently different.
5. There is a signiﬁ   cant negative relation between US 
and European credit spread changes and the US and 
European market return respectively. The sensitivity 
coefﬁ   cients for the US and the European are simi-
lar. Finally, there is no clear evidence that the effect 
depends on the rating.
6. A change in the risk-free rate is economically much 
more important than the market return. The effect of 
a change in the risk-free rate on credit spread changes 
is much stronger than the effect of the market return. 
Furthermore, Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) ﬁ  nd that the 
market return, which is an aggregated return, has a 
much larger impact than the ﬁ  rm-speciﬁ  c equity return.
7. There is a signiﬁ   cant positive relation between credit 
spread changes and changes in the volatility of the 
market. The impact of volatility is similar for US and 
Euro credit spread changes. Collin-Dufresne (2001) and 
Van Landschoot (2004) ﬁ  nd that the effect of the vola-
tility is asymmetric, i.e. positive changes in the volatility 
have a much larger impact than negative changes.
8. Liquidity proxies have a signiﬁ   cant impact on credit 
spread changes in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and 
Van Landschoot (2004). In both studies, the effect 
becomes stronger for lower rated bonds.
The empirical results in Section 3 and the overview of the 
literature suggest that the determinants of credit spread 
changes on US and European corporate bonds are very 
similar. Although the Euro corporate bond market is less 
liquid and smaller than the US corporate bond market 
(see Chart 1), the conclusions are very similar.
The magnitude of the effects depends more on the lever-
age or rating of the issuing ﬁ  rm and the maturity of the 
bond than on the country or currency of issuance. To illus-
trate these ﬁ  ndings, we plot the credit spreads on AAA 
and BBB rated US and Euro corporate bonds with 7 to 
10 years to maturity (see Chart 3). The credit spreads on 
bonds with a similar rating but issued in different regions 
(US and Euro area) behave in a much more similar way 
than the credit spreads on corporate bonds with differ-
ent ratings (AAA and BBB) but issued in the same region. 
Credit spreads on BBB rated bonds are higher and more 
volatile than credit spreads on AAA rated bonds, regard-
less of the country or currency of issuance. We ﬁ  nd similar 
results for bonds with different maturities. Credit spreads 
















CHART 3  CREDIT SPREADS ON US AND EMU AAA AND 
BBB RATED CORPORATE BONDS WITH 7 TO  
10 YEARS TO MATURITY
  (Basis points)
Source : Bloomberg (Merrill Lynch).
US AAA rated bonds
US BBB rated bonds
Euro AAA rated bonds
Euro BBB rated bonds150
to maturity behave much more similarly than do credit 
spreads on Euro (US) corporate bonds with 1-3 and 
7-10 years to maturity.
The creation of a Euro corporate bond market has improved 
(reduced) the diversiﬁ  cation (concentration) of credit risk 
(by deﬁ  nition) because investors have the opportunity to 
invest in more regions. However, one should not exagger-
ate this effect. Credit spreads and thus market prices of 
US and Euro corporate bonds behave in very similar ways. 
Although we do not perform a detailed analysis of credit 
risk diversiﬁ  cation, Chart 3 seems to indicate that investors 
should diversify their portfolio by investing in bonds with 
different ratings and/or maturities.
Empirical studies for both regions are unable to explain 
more than 45  p.c. of the variation of credit spread 
changes. This suggests that we still have limited knowl-
edge about the determinants of credit spread changes. 
Interestingly, it does not appear as if the residual com-
ponent of the credit spread changes, i.e. the component 
that remains unexplained by credit risk models, can be 
considered as idiosyncratic risk. Along these lines, Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001) perform a factor analysis and ﬁ  nd 
that the residual component is mainly driven by one sys-
tematic component. We expect that a similar result would 
be obtained if such an exercise were to be undertaken 
for Europe.
6.   Additional Factors to Explain Credit 
Spreads
6.1 Components  of  Credit  Spreads
As suggested above, a question that is still unresolved 
in the literature is why a large part of the dynam-
ics of credit spreads remains unexplained. In order to 
address this question, several studies (Elton et al. (2001), 
Delianedis and Geske (2002), Driessen (2003), D’Amato 
and Remolona (2003), and Perraudin and Taylor (2004)) 
attempt to decompose the credit spread into several fac-
tors such as expected loss, tax effect, liquidity risk, and 
a risk premium. The risk premium is often deﬁ  ned as an 
additional premium for risk-averse investors.  (16)
Elton et al. (2001) decompose the credit spread into 
three components, namely expected loss, tax effect, and 
a risk premium. They ﬁ   nd that the taxation difference 
between corporate and government bonds have a larger 
impact on credit spreads than expected loss. Furthermore, 
they conclude that the part of credit spreads that is not 
accounted for by taxes and expected default (85  p.c.), 
can be explained as a reward for bearing systematic risk. 
Driessen (2003) decompose the credit spread into four 
components, namely expected loss, tax effect, liquidity, 
and a risk premium. The author describes the risk premium 
as a premium for the risk associated with changes in credit 
spreads (if no default occurs) and the risk of the default 
event. The latter is associated with the jump in prices in 
case of a default event (default jump risk). (17) The empirical 
results seem to imply that the default jump risk is not fully 
diversiﬁ  able. Expected loss explains only between 3.5 to 
34.7  percent of the credit spreads. Furthermore, the 
importance of taxes, the risk premium, and the liquidity 
premium depend on the rating and maturity of the bond. 
Perraudin and Taylor (2004) ﬁ  nd that liquidity signiﬁ  cantly 
inﬂ  uences credit spreads. Making a distinction between 
low and high liquid bonds according to various liquidity 
proxies results in spread differences of 10  to 28  basis 
points for AAA to A grade bonds.
D’Amato and Remolona (2003) argue that credit spreads 
are largely a compensation for the difﬁ  culty of diversify-
ing credit risk (diversiﬁ  cation risk). They argue that the 
assumption that investors can diversify away unexpected 
losses (which are any losses different from the mean) of 
default risk by holding a large enough portfolio does not 
hold in practice. The nature of default risk is such that the 
distribution of returns on corporate bonds is highly nega-
tively skewed, i.e. the distribution has a long left tail.
As an illustration of skewness, consider the following 
example. Suppose that we have a portfolio of assets with 
an average return of 5 p.c. and a standard deviation of 
2 p.c. If the distribution of the portfolio returns is strongly 
negatively skewed, investors have a higher probability of 
earning returns that are far below the average return of 
5 p.c. (extreme losses) than earning returns much above 
5  p.c. Investors want to be compensated for this risk 
unless it can be diversiﬁ  ed away. D’Amato and Remolona 
(2003) conclude that skewness in returns is a critical 
factor that stands in the way of diversiﬁ  cation.
Another factor that may also explain the poor results of 
previous empirical analyses of credit spreads is recovery 
risk. The expected loss on a bond depends on the prob-
ability of default and the loss given default (or recovery 
rate). It is very likely that bonds with a high recovery rate 
will have lower credit spreads. However, individual data 
on recovery rates are not readily available. Therefore, most 
empirical studies assume a constant recovery rate, which 
is similar across assets.
(16)  Note that there is no unique deﬁ  nition of “the risk premium”. Different studies 
often have different deﬁ  nitions.
(17)  Elton et al. (2001) only consider the risk associated with changes in credit 
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6.1  Distribution of Stock and Bond Portfolios
Empirical studies show that credit risk loss distributions 
have thick tails, i.e. are skewed. However, the prominence 
of these properties seems to depend on the composition 
of the speciﬁ  c portfolio under consideration (see Lucas et 
al. 2001). D’Amato and Remolona (2003) argue that the 
distributions of bond and stock portfolios are signiﬁ  cantly 
different ; bond returns are much more negatively skewed 
to the left. D’Amato and Remolona (2003) illustrate the 
difﬁ  culty of diversifying credit risk by presenting the loss 
distribution of two hypothetical bond portfolios.
Similar to D’Amato and Remolona (2003), we perform 
simulations to obtain the loss distributions of hypothetical 
portfolios. However, we simulate the loss distributions of 
bond and stock portfolios in a Merton framework. The 
aim is to analyse how the loss distribution depends on 
the composition of the portfolios, the size of the port-
folios, the assumptions about the leverage of the ﬁ  rms, 
the correlation of the assets in the portfolios, and the 
risk-free rate.
6.1.1 Simulation  Exercise  :  Assumptions
Suppose that we have three portfolios, one of 100 p.c. 
bonds (bond portfolio), one of 100  p.c. stocks (stock 
portfolio), one of 50 p.c. bonds and 50 p.c. stocks (mixed 
portfolio). To analyse whether the size of the portfolio 
inﬂ   uences the results, we consider portfolios with 50, 
100, and 300 assets. We assume that each ﬁ  rm’s asset 
value equals 100 at the start (t = 0). In order to evaluate 
the value of the portfolio after one period, say one year 
(t = 1), we need to make assumptions on how the asset 
value of the ﬁ  rms evolve. We assume that the average 
growth rate of the asset value equals 5  p.c., the asset 
volatility equals 3 p.c., and that the value can make jumps 
(see jump-diffusion process, i.e. a process that allows for 
sudden jumps in the asset value).(18) At time t = 1, we need 
to evaluate whether a ﬁ  rm has defaulted or not. In accord-
ance with the Merton model, we assume that a ﬁ  rm has 
defaulted when the value of the assets falls below the 
value of the debt. We assume that a ﬁ  rm’s balance sheet 
consists of 50 p.c. debt at time t = 1. This implies that 
a ﬁ  rm defaults if its asset value is smaller than 50 after 
one year. If default occurs, bondholders will recover the 
‘residual’ asset value. So, the recovery rate is not ﬁ  xed 
but depends on the asset value in the case of default. 
Stockholders lose everything in the case of default. We 
allow for a correlation of 0.1 between the asset value of 
the ﬁ  rms issuing bonds and/or stocks. The risk-free inter-
est rate equals 4 p.c.
6.1.2 Simulation  Exercise  :  Results
Table 5  shows the summary statistics of the simulated 
loss distribution of 9 portfolios  : 3  stock portfolios 
(50, 100, and 300 stocks), 3 bond portfolios (50, 100, and 
300  bonds), and 3  mixed portfolios (50, 100, and 300 
assets). If we compare the loss distribution of the 100 p.c. 
bond portfolios and the 100 p.c. stock portfolios, we ﬁ  nd 
that the average loss and the standard deviation of the 
stock portfolios are much larger compared to the bond 
portfolios. This is in accordance with our   expectations, 
TABLE 5 SUMMARY STATISTICS OF SIMULATED LOSS DISTRIBUTION
(Mean and standard deviation are given in percentages)
Source: Own calculations based on 10,000 simulations.
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis
50 stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.34 2.26 1.04 4.19
50 bonds   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.37 0.46 1.69 6.69
25 stocks & 25 bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.35 1.32 1.07 4.29
100 stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.33 1.72 0.95 4.26
100 bonds   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.37 0.35 1.37 5.64
50 stocks & 50 bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.35 1.00 0.98 4.41
300 stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.34 1.18 0.82 4.06
300 bonds   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.37 0.22 0.98 4.35
150 stocks & 150 bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.36 0.69 0.83 4.08
(18)  In the extreme case of no default, the loss distribution will be a ﬂ  at line with a 
probability of one having zero loss. In order to have an “interesting” case study 
with some defaults, we allow for negative jumps in the asset value. There will 
be more defaults if we allow for larger negative jumps in the asset value.  152
namely that stocks are riskier. Mixed portfolios, i.e. port-
folios of 50 p.c. bonds and 50 p.c. stocks, have an aver-
age loss and standard deviation between the stock and 
bond portfolios. If the number of assets increases, the 
volatility of the losses decreases for all portfolios.
The loss distribution of all portfolios is skewed, which 
means that the probability of having extremely high 
losses is higher than having almost no losses. The skew-
ness of the loss distributions of the bond portfolios, is 
always larger than for the stock portfolios, although the 
difference in skewness between stock and bond portfolios 
becomes smaller for larger portfolios. The same holds for 
the kurtosis, i.e. the peakedness or ﬂ  atness of the distri-
bution.(19) Our results provide evidence that the loss dis-
tributions of bond portfolios are more skewed than stock 
portfolios and that the composition of portfolios matters. 
However, if investors hold a mixed portfolio, i.e. a port-
folio of stocks and bonds, the skewness and the kurtosis 
are only slightly higher than for stock portfolios. This 
result brings into question the importance of the skew-
ness of the loss distribution of bonds compared to stocks 
for ﬁ  nancial institutions that have large mixed portfolios.
To analyse whether assumptions about the correlation 
between the ﬁ  rms’ asset value, the interest rate, the lev-
erage ratio, and the growth rate and the volatility of the 
ﬁ  rms’ asset value inﬂ  uence the results, we change these 
parameters one by one. First, we change the correlation 
between the ﬁ  rms’ asset value from 0.1 to 0.4 and 0.9. 
Changing the correlation from 10  p.c. to 40  p.c. does 
not alter the conclusions. However, if the correlation 
is extremely high (90  p.c.), the difference between the 
skewness of the loss distributions of stock and bond port-
folios increases for larger portfolios, and diversiﬁ  cation 
becomes more difﬁ  cult. This result is not surprising, since 
a high correlation implies that the assets either all survive 
or default. Chart 4 presents the distribution of portfolios 
of 300 stocks assuming that the correlation between the 
ﬁ  rms’ value is 10 p.c. and 90 p.c. respectively. Under the 
assumption of 90 p.c. correlation between the ﬁ  rms’ 
asset values, the loss distribution is much more skewed, 
i.e. there is a higher probability of experiencing a large 
number of losses (see right part of chart  4). However, it is 
very unlikely that the correlation is that high in practice.
Notice that even under the assumption of a high correlation 
(e.g. 90 p.c.), the skewness of the loss distribution of mixed 
portfolios is still very similar to that of stock portfolios. This 
suggests that the ‘problem’ of the skewness of bond portfo-
lios almost disappears when stocks are added (50 p.c.).
(19)  The kurtosis of the normal distribution is 3. If the kurtosis is higher (less) than 3, 
the distribution is peaked or leptokurtic (ﬂ  at or platykurtic).


















CHART 4  SIMULATED LOSS DISTRIBUTION OF STOCK PORTFOLIO WITH 10 P.C. AND 90 P.C. CORRELATION ASSUMPTION
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In order to evaluate the effect of the leverage of the 
ﬁ  rm on our results, we change the composition of the 
asset value  : 70  p.c. debt – 30  p.c. equity and 30  p.c. 
debt – 70 p.c. equity. Simulations with these new values, 
however, do not yield qualitatively different results. 
Furthermore, we ﬁ  nd that changing the risk-free rate, the 
growth rate of the asset value, and the volatility of the 
asset value inﬂ  uences the results somewhat but does not 
alter the conclusions.
The main conclusions of the simulation exercise are :
–  The skewness of the loss distribution of stock and bond 
portfolios is lower for larger portfolios (300 assets). This 
suggests that stockholders as well as bondholders can 
beneﬁ  t from having larger portfolios.
– The skewness of the loss distribution of bond portfo-
lios is higher than for stock portfolios. However, the 
difference signiﬁ   cantly decreases for larger portfolios 
(300 assets) and with a low to moderate level of cor-
relation between ﬁ  rm values (less than 40 p.c.).
– The skewness of the loss distribution of mixed port-
folios is only slightly higher than for stock portfolios. 
Indeed, for large portfolios (300 assets), the skewness 
of the loss distributions is very similar. Thus, one may 
question the importance of skewness for institutional 
investors.
– Although we ﬁ  nd that pure bond portfolios are more 
highly skewed than pure stock portfolios, this analysis 
does not indicate how important skewness is for credit 
spreads relative to other factors such as liquidity risk 
and the systematic shocks.
7. Conclusions
The main focus of this article has been the analysis of 
the determinants of corporate bond spreads in US and 
Europe. Structural credit risk models, introduced by Black 
and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), are used to derive 
determinants of credit spreads such as the risk-free inter-
est rate, the asset value, and asset volatility. Our analysis 
of Euro corporate bonds (1998-2002), yields results in 
support of those reported in previous studies. We ﬁ  nd a 
negative relation between changes in the level and the 
slope of the risk-free term structure and credit spread 
changes. In addition, we ﬁ   nd that high return and a 
decrease in the volatility of the DJ Euro Stoxx reduces 
credit spread changes. We also ﬁ   nd that credit spread 
changes signiﬁ  cantly increase with liquidity risk. A gen-
eral conclusion, however, that can be drawn from most 
empirical studies is that an important portion of the vari-
ation in credit spreads remains unexplained.
Our empirical analysis also indicates that the rela-
tion between credit spread changes and ﬁ  nancial  and 
ma  croeconomic variables depends on the rating and the 
maturity of the bonds. Credit spreads on bonds with lower 
ratings and longer maturities are often more strongly 
affected by macroeconomic changes than spreads on 
bonds with higher ratings and shorter maturities.
A comparison of results of empirical studies of US and 
European credit spreads reveals that the same factors are 
important for both regions. Even though the US corporate 
bond market is broader and more liquid, the results for 
European credit spreads are comparable with those for 
the US. Examination of the dynamics of credit spreads 
on different types of corporate bonds, however, suggests 
that this result should not be surprising. The effect of 
ﬁ  nancial and macro-economic variables on credit spreads 
appears to depend more on the rating and maturity of the 
bonds than on the country or currency of issuance. Credit 
spreads on US and European rated bonds with the same 
rating exhibit a similar pattern, whereas credit spreads on 
European corporate bonds with different ratings behave 
differently.
Empirical studies to date have succeeded in explaining 
only a small portion of the variation in credit spreads. 
Several possible explanations for this lack of explana-
tory power have been put forward, such as liquidity risk, 
taxation differences, and a risk premium for systematic 
shocks. Most empirical studies ﬁ   nd that liquidity risk 
and systematic shocks signiﬁ  cantly affect credit spreads. 
Another explanation has been proposed by D’Amato and 
Remolona (2003), who suggest that diversiﬁ  cation risk, 
i.e. the risk of unexpected losses from default that are 
present in bond portfolios and cannot be diversiﬁ  ed, might 
explain a substantial portion of credit spread changes. Our 
simulation analysis has shown that the skewness of the 
loss distributions of pure bond portfolios is indeed higher 
than for pure stock portfolios. However, the skewness of 
mixed portfolios (50 p.c. bonds and 50 p.c. stocks) is very 
similar to that of pure stock portfolios. This result calls into 
question the importance of the skewness of pure bond 
portfolios for explaining credit spread changes. Although 
these simulations suggest answers to some questions 
regarding the loss distributions of bond and stock port-
folios, it remains an open question as to how important 
diversiﬁ  cation risk is relative to other factors in explaining 
credit spread changes.154
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